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Abstract
This paper examines some concepts regarding religion and conﬂict, more speciﬁcally, the role of Islamic 
religious leaders in the conﬂict resolution. In many Muslim countries, Islamic religious leaders play signiﬁcant 
roles, not only in the religious realm, but also in the social, cultural, and even political realm. In contrast, 
the social environment will also determine the level of quality of religious leader’s inﬂuence in the form of 
obedience from citizens over the handling of (resolution) social problems in general and speciﬁcally conﬂict. 
In the heterogeneous socio-economic structure community realizing those are becoming a major challenge. 
This article examines the relationship between socio-economic structure of the community with the conﬂict 
resolution through the role of the local informal leader, in this case religious leaders (ulama). Data analysis 
was performed using a combination of SUSENAS and PODES provided by BPS, the unit of analysis based 
communities around 70,000 villages which aggregated at about 480 districts/cities level of 33 provinces in 
Indonesia in 2011. At initial stage, we creating speciﬁc ulama’s quality measurement, named Indek Kualitas 
Pengaruh Ulama. Then, because of abundance of zero conﬂict cases and data overdispersion, we analyze this 
index relation with socio-economic communities structure through ZIP (Zero-Inﬂated Poisson) regression. 
This study found that "stable" socio-economic structure of the communities are determine the ulama’s quality. 
On the one hand, worsening community social cohesion represented by the high polarization index, tend 
to erode the ulama’s role (inﬂuence) especially in resolving conﬂict. Conversely, a low polarization index, 
boosted the conﬁdence level (general trust) to the role of ulama.
Keywords: Informal Leadership, Community Structure, Conﬂict Resolution, Ulama Inﬂuence
INTRODUCTION
Religious leaders (Ulama) is an informal 
ﬁgures who played an important role in various 
aspects of life of Muslims since the ﬁrst. In 
addition to the role as a religious mentor for 
the citizens, religious leaders also serve as a 
solution to the socio-economic problems and 
so on. Many posts were already discussing 
how to type and tidal inﬂuence of the religious 
leader’s role in the long history of the nation. 
Therefore, this paper tries to limit itself to the 
role of the contemporary scholars in addressing 
socio-economic issues of cutting-edge at the 
local level. One is the social conﬂict Which is 
currently of concern to various parties.
This issue becomes important, because at 
this time the inﬂuence of the religious leader's 
role was facing a major challenge with various 
complexity, dynamics and recency problem. 
This indirectly will determine the quality of his 
inﬂuence in the eyes of citizens (the ummah). 
In contrast to the formal leader who gained 
inﬂuence of authority and power derived, 
informal leaders receive from the trust (trust) 
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resident will be the capacity of leadership. This 
trust makes people want to follow his orders to 
do and not do something voluntarily on behalf 
of the joint (common good).
But doing so is not easy. In the heterogeneous 
socio-economic structure community, realizing 
it is becoming a big challenge. Residents will 
have the will to supply of or intervene for the 
common good if they share a mutual trust and 
solidarity (Ostrom, 2000). This means that if the 
residents, who live in the region, trust each other 
and are ready to help and reply, they would be 
willing to intervene, even in case of danger or 
unpleasant situations and emergencies.
There is a general consensus that trust is 
an important requirement for performance 
eﬃciency for every kind institution at local 
and national level in broader term. Not 
surprisingly, many social scientists trying to 
understand the determinants of trust and why 
it varies greatly across countries (Knack and 
Keefer, 1997; Zak and Knack, 2001). Most of 
this research has focused on the relationship 
between trust and heterogeneity (and other 
sizes of heterogeneity as fractionalization on 
ethnicity, religion or income) and reached 
the general conclusion that there is a strong 
negative correlation between heterogeneity (or 
inequality) to common belief (general trust).
According to the literature, the correlation is 
driven by three main factors. First, the principle 
of homophily (Mc Pherson et al., 2001) and 
resistance to heterogeneity (Alesina and La Ferrara, 
2002). From this perspective, economic inequality 
is a source of diversity and socio-economic 
distance: the higher the degree of economic 
inequality, the higher the "social barriers" between 
diﬀerent groups and individuals will feel less 
familiar with and connect to other people. This, 
in turn, inhibits the formation of trust. 
Secondly, with regard to the concept of 
justice. Heterogeneity or precisely inequality 
can produce a perception of injustice and the 
belief that other people have unfair advantages, 
thus inhibiting the development of trust in 
others. The third refers to the hypothesis of 
a resource conﬂict. That is, people who are 
unbalanced, may not agree on how to share 
(and pay for) public goods (public goods). 
This conﬂict, in turn, break down social ties 
and reduces the formation of trust and social 
cohesion (Delhey and Newton, 2005).
Coupled with the variety of characteristics 
of the population living in urban and rural 
areas, as well as working in various sectors, 
Indonesia has completed as a heterogenizing 
nation-state. On the one hand, the diversity 
is an valuable asset, but on the other hand, 
it may be a potential drivers of increases in 
inequality and polarization which may lead to 
social conﬂict. Barron et al. (2004) contended 
that the existence of various ethnic, religious, 
and/or linguistic groups could enhance the 
likelihood of conﬂict. In line with this, Easterly 
and Levine (1997) suggested that the presence 
of multiple ethnic groups had often been 
associated with lower growth and a higher 
probability of conﬂict or even civil war.
This article examines the relationship 
between socio-economic structure of the 
community with the conﬂict resolution through 
the role of the informal character, in this case 
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religious leaders (ulama). The main purpose of 
the paper is to bring these theoretical predictions 
to the data at the Indonesian macro level (city/
district). This study is expected to explain the role 
of informal leaders especially religious leaders in 
overcoming conﬂicts; related types of conﬂicts 
that can be resolved, the factors that determine 
variations in the quality of the role of the religious 
leaders as well as map out the area where he still 
play a role in this context.
LITERATURE REVIEW
As other informal leaders, the role of the 
clergy and the quality of the eﬀect is not formed 
in a vacuum chambers. Leaders require followers, 
no leaders without followers. Relationships 
between leaders and followers should be a two-
way relationship that is formed through a series 
of long process. In general, this also applies 
in relations between religious leaders and his 
followers people. How is the process run and 
what factors aﬀect the adherents of citizens will 
trust and follow their religious leaders?.
Religious Identity 
The construction of religious identity 
through its embodied beliefs and rituals 
can also be viewed from Bourdieu’s theory of 
practice. Theory of practice tries to bridge the 
dichotomy between agents and structures, 
objectivity and subjectivity, individual and 
social. For Bourdieu, “theory of practice is the 
precondition for establishing an experimental 
science of the dialectic of the internalization 
of externality and the externalization of 
internality, or, more simply, of incorporation 
and objectiﬁcation (Bourdieu, 1977:72). 
Echoing Marx’s ideas, the theory of practice as 
practice insists, against positivist materialism, 
that the objects of knowledge are constructed, 
and against idealist intellectualism, that the 
principle of this construction is practical 
activity oriented towards practical functions.
There are three interrelated concepts 
in Bourdieu’s theory of practice: habitus, 
capital and ﬁeld. The ﬁrst concept, habitus, 
is “the generative principle of the objectively 
classiﬁable judgments and the systems of 
classiﬁcation” (Bourdieu, 1984:170). Habitus 
is the ability to produce classiﬁable practices 
and works, and the capacity to diﬀerentiate 
and appreciate these practices and products. 
It is necessity internalized and converted 
into a disposition that generates meaningful 
practices and meaning-giving perceptions 
(Bourdieu, 1984:170). Habitus, for Bourdieu, 
is not only organizes practices and perception 
of practices, but also organizes the perception 
of the social world which is itself the product 
of internalization of the division into social 
classes (Bourdieu, 1984:170). One of the 
fundamental eﬀects of the orchestration of 
habitus is “the production of a commonsense 
world endowed with the objectivity secured 
by consensus on the meaning of practices and 
the world” (Bourdieu, 1977: 80). 
The second concept is capital, which goes 
beyond the notion of Marx’s material assets to 
capital. The term of cultural capital refers to 
non-ﬁnancial social assets that promote social 
mobility beyond economic means. These can 
include education, intellect, styles of speech, 
dress, and even physical appearance. The third 
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concept is ﬁeld. Bourdieu shared Weber's 
view, contrary to traditional Marxism, that 
society cannot be analyzed simply in terms 
of economic classes and ideologies. Instead of 
analyzing societies in terms of classes, Bourdieu 
uses the concept of ﬁeld: “the various social and 
institutional arenas in which people express and 
reproduce their dispositions, and where they 
compete for the distribution of diﬀerent kinds 
of capital” (Bourdieu, 1977:95,). A ﬁeld is a 
network, structure or set of relationships which 
may be intellectual, religious, educational, 
or cultural. The position of each particular 
agent in the ﬁeld is thus a result of interaction 
between the speciﬁc rules of the ﬁeld, agent's 
habitus and agent's capital (social, economic 
and cultural).
By utilizing Bourdieu’s theoretical 
framework of the theory of practice, it is 
possible to read that the construction of 
identity among Muslims is closely related to the 
‘practices’ of Islamic individuals in terms of his 
or her habitus, capital, and ﬁeld. It means that 
the dynamic strategies of relationships among 
diﬀerent habitus of individuals Muslims, 
the capitals owned by individuals Muslims, 
and the ﬁelds of speciﬁc Islamic beliefs and 
ritual practices will be very inﬂuential in the 
formation of diﬀerent Muslim identities. 
In short, according to Bourdieu’s theory, 
the success of leader-follower relationship 
also driven by the principle of homophily 
(McPherson et al., 2001) and resistance 
to heterogeneity (Alesina and La Ferrara 
2002). From this perspective, every type of 
heterogeneity especially in worsen form as 
inequality is a source of diversity and socio-
economic distance: the higher the degree of 
heterogeneity (inequality), the higher the 
"social barriers" between diﬀerent groups and 
individuals will feel less familiar with and 
connect to other people. This, in turn, inhibits 
the formation of trust. 
Trust and Leadership
In terms of management, transformational 
leaders (James McGregor Burns, 1978) used 
to classify people who are willing and able 
to motivate others to join the movement 
to a certain standard and vice versa inspire 
his followers. It becomes a challenge to the 
notion that rational considerations as the 
only motivation to engage in acts of social 
control. Therefore, individuals may also be 
driven by social incentives include keeping 
their reputation or the interests of altruistic. 
Furthermore, leader attention to the interests 
and needs of followers is essential to achieve 
eﬀective leadership. In the political realm, 
Burns said that "only the followers themselves 
can ultimately deﬁne their own true needs … 
[given] an informed choice" (1978:36).
From the outset, followers perceive and 
respond to a leader's qualities, including 
his or her recognized legitimacy, as well as 
motivation, and performance. In this vein, 
Gary Wills stated that "Followers judge leaders. 
Only if the leaders pass that test do they have 
any impact" (1994, p. 21). Although his latter 
point may not prevail in the face of someone in 
a determining position of authority, Wills says 
in his conclusion that "so much of leadership 
is the projection of an image that will appeal 
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to followers" (p. 274). Therefore, "reality" 
is projected by a leader through perceptual 
manipulation (Gray & Densten, 2007). 
The aphorism "An ounce of image is worth 
a pound of performance" may not be taken 
literally, but such perceptions by followers can 
obscure their awareness of actual deﬁciencies in 
a leader's performance. However, perception 
guides behavior, inﬂuenced by motivation. 
Changes can occur in perception, when 
enriched by experience. The prospect for trust 
or mistrust may thereby grow. If positive, there 
will likely be loyalty and solidarity of purpose 
and the reverse is also likely. Trust and loyalty 
are among those qualities needed to bind 
relationships. 
METHODOLOGY
Although many theory above describe also 
about the successful leaders characteristics, 
this study will not explored in that context. 
Speciﬁcally, this study will examine the 
part of relationship between the role of 
structure (identity) of local community such 
as socioeconomic heterogeneity; ethnic and 
income, demographics such as the number of 
children in the household, households headed 
by female, toward the quality of ulama as 
their informal leader. So, from there we could 
answer the question when will the ulama get 
his follower obedience and in what kind of 
community from he will get it.
Data and Variables
Our dependent variable is religious leader 
role (quality) in resolving conﬂict, togarate. At 
meanwhile, out main independent variable 
is heterogeneity ; including polarization and 
inequality of income. This study combines 
individual-level data on the income aspect 
SUSENAS (Survey Sosial Ekonomi Nasional) 
module 2011 and data which proxied the role 
of informal leader at the level of villages using 
of PODES (Potensi Desa) 2011 and various 
other national resepresentasi of data. PODES 
questionnaire has variables that can be used as 
a proxy of this case, namely, variable r1302a 
about the mass brawl that could be reconciled. 
So in this case there are two types of villages, 
which are in the village ;
1 = mass brawl can be reconciled 
0 = mass brawl could not be reconciled
Furthermore, there is a variable r1302b, 
which contains questions about the role of 
each character in reconciling a mass brawl, 
ranging from the security forces, government 
apparatus, religious leaders, community leaders 
and so on. In this case, it just would have been 
the answer if 8, means that only analyze the role 
of religious leaders (named variable as toga). 
Otherwise, if the answer is 4, means that only 
analyze the role of community leaders (named 
variable as toma)
toga
1 = if r1302a*r1302b==8, meaning the mass  
  brawl could be reconciled by 8 (relig’ lead)
0 = others
toma
1 = if r1302a*r1302b==4, meaning the mass  
  brawl could be reconciled by 4 (comm’lead)
0 = others
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So where in the village a mass brawl 
could be reconciled by the two ﬁgures, either 
alone or both by them are considered to have 
the inﬂuence on local community. Then, we 
propose some control variables which create 
from the data of the village with unique 
characteristics which aggregated to the city/
district level. There are residential mobility, 
which suspected to aﬀect conﬂict indirectly 
by interfering with social networks and 
relationships (Sampson & Groves, 1989), 
weakening the capacity of local organizations 
(Wilson, 1996) and slow assimilation of 
new members (Janowitz, 1974). Sampson 
(1987) and Wilson (1987) agree that family 
interference aﬀects the level of conﬂict with the 
weakening of the family's ability to supervise 
the younger members. 
Family disruption refers to the phenomenon 
of households headed by a single parent - 
usually women, including the head of the 
household who are divorced, widowed or 
separated (Sampson & Groves, 1989). It is 
strongly associated with juvenile delinquency 
and adult social disorder behavior both among 
household white majority and minority 
(Sampson & Wilson, 1995). Finally, Sampson 
and Groves (1989) argues that urbanization 
can inﬂuence conﬂict by weakening the ties 
of friendship and kinship networks and local 
participation.
Table 1. Village Characteristics Aggregation at City/District level
Village
(PODES)
Ratio at City/district level Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Religous leaders resolving conflict (1=Yes; 
0=No)
togarate 386 6.259 63.112 0 1162.117
There are actively social inst (1=Yes; 0=No) lemsos 420 0.016 0.0278 0.0001 0.16
There are actively community insf (1=Yes; 
0=No) 
lemasy 486 0.039 0.0482 0.0002 0.35
There are village representative body(1=Yes; 
0=No)
bpd 173 0.002 0.003 0.0005 0.014
There are mass brawl in >2 ethnic village 
(1=Yes; 0=No) idak)
konf 492 0.685 1.475 0 14
City/district(SUSENAS)
gini2011 gini 502 0.326 0.048 0.184 0.478
gini2010 gini2010 502 0.284 0.045 0.187 0.461
Polarisation income 2011 polarisasi 478 0.287 0.069 0.093 0.552
Rerata pengeluaran per kapita (mean_ln) RT lnmeaninc 502 13.28 0.328 12.19 14.26
Ratio of Population age 0-7 y.o anak 502 0.005 0.005 0.0005 0.072
Ratio population live in urban Urbrate 478 0.398 0.316 0.008 1
Ratio household headed by female femalehh 502 0.126 0.044 0.009 0.27
Ratio household with own-home rumah 502 0.668 0.137 0.22 0.991
Village located in Java island (1=Yes; 0 =No) Jawa 502 0.434 0.496 0 1
Village mean income>median income (1=Yes; 
0 =No)
Kaya  502 0.645 0.479 0 1
Sorces : Authors’ calculation from PODES and SUSENAS 2011
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Meanwhile, it also included the variable 
availability of social and civic institutions. 
Local participation in formal and voluntary 
organizations arguably supplied the community 
with solidarity, institutional stability and 
increased capacity to control youth (Hunter, 
1974; Kornhauser, 1978; Shaw & McKay, 
1969 in Sampson & Groves, 1989, 778-779).
This institutional variables are also 
considered important for analysis to determine 
the source whence the inﬂuence of communities 
religious leaders came from. If assumed that 
informal ﬁgure is identical to the existence 
of similar institutions, then their success in 
leading or managing this agency be a proxy 
of the source of their inﬂuence. 
Then all of this data peroxide the variables 
aggregated to the level of city/district according 
to the purpose and scope of the study. The 
process of aggregation is done in three (3) 
phases. First, add the data at the individual and 
household levels, both in numerical and binary, 
into the city/district level. Second, followed 
by making the proportion (ratio) by dividing 
this ﬁgure by the number of village in the city/
district level. Third, followed by making the 
proportion (ratio) of population by dividing 
village’s population by total population in the 
city/district level. 
Creating Informal Influence Quality Index
To measure (quality of ) the inﬂuence of 
the informal leaders at the level of city/district, 
we created the index, named the (quality of ) 
inﬂuence of informal leaders index. This Index 
value will be inﬂuenced by the ratio of total 
incidence and the ratio of the population in 
the area where the conﬂict can be reconciled 
by each informal leaders.
(quality of ) inﬂuence of religious leaders 
index per 10.000 population
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So, ivtoga  stated in the villages i  in the city/
district v  , religious leaders managed to reconcile 
the conﬂict. Meanwhile ivtogapop _ state the 
number of population in where religious leaders 
(community leaders) managed to reconcile 
the conﬂict and vpoptot _ expressed total 
population residing in the city/district.
By multiplying with the number 10,000, 
then this index by itself would have a value in 
the range 0-10,0000. So in this case, we assume 
that the city/district with an index value of 
10,000 as city/district that had an informal 
character with the highest inﬂuence (quality 
of). That is, if the index whose by a city/district 
worth 500 then it can be said the role of the 
clergy was to be recognized by each of 500 per 
10,000 population in the city/district.
Furthermore, suppose a city/disrict have 
the total population of 1 million people, the 
scholars will aﬀect the (1,000,000 / 10,000) 
* 500 inhabitants, ie 50,000 inhabitants. 
In this context, more and more of the 
population became followers of religious 
leaders (community leaders), it can be said that 
the more the quality of the religious leaders. 
Conversely, the lower the index value, closer 
to 0, the lower the quality of informal leaders 
at the level of city/disrict . 
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In this case it is considered that the variation 
level "quality" religious leaders in a city/district 
can be measured in real terms taking into 
account variations in the population amount 
at the level of city/district. This performance 
variables are used because we do not have 
the data quantity (nominal amount) of each 
informal leaders in each village explicitly.
By using these variables, then we can judge 
fairly because we have eliminated the impact 
of number of population variations on the 
quality of religious leadersl inﬂuence. So, we 
can say that the city/district "A", whose more 
population will have the same informal leader's 
quality level with city/district "B", whose 
smaller population if the index have the same 
worth for both cities.
Estimation Strategic
Real-life count data are frequently 
characterized by over dispersion and excess 
zeros. The rare events nature of conﬂict counts 
are controlled for in the formulas of both 
Poisson and Negative Binomial regression. 
However, Poisson and Negative Binomial 
regression models diﬀer in regards to their 
assumptions of the conditional mean and 
variance of the dependent variable. Poisson 
models assume that the conditional mean 
and variance of the distribution are equal 
(equidispersion). Negative binomial regression 
models do not assume an equal mean and 
variance and particularly correct for over 
dispersion in the data, which is when the 
variance is greater than the conditional mean. 
When the over dispersion occurs, the Poisson 
regression is not appropriate to be used, because 
although it generates consistent estimators of 
regression parameters, but it may produce 
biased estimator of the standard deviation.
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Graph 1. Histogram of index toga Variable
Sorces : Authors’ calculation from PODES 2011
So, Zero-inﬂated count models provide 
a parsimonious yet powerful way to model 
this type of situation. The main motivation 
for zero-inﬂated count models is that real-life 
data frequently display over dispersion and 
excess zeros (Greene 1994). Zero-inﬂated 
count models provide a way of modeling the 
excess zeros in addition to allowing for over 
dispersion.
Zero-inﬂated poison (ZIP) regression is 
used to model count data that has an excess of 
zero counts. Such models assume that the data 
are a mixture of two separate data generation 
processes: one generates only zeros, and the 
other is either a Poisson or a negative binomial 
data-generating process. 
Further, theory suggests that the excess 
zeros are generated by a separate process from 
the count values and that the excess zeros can be 
modeled independently. Thus, the zip model 
has two parts, a poisson count model and 
the logit model for predicting excess zeros. 
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In the describing data, the response variable 
describing the abundance zero (0) cases of 
incidence of conﬂict over the village. To 
overcome this problem, ZIP regression will be 
employed. From graph 1, we conclude that our 
data suﬀer for excess zero and over dispersion. 
Then, model that we propose is.
ivviviviv GHXtogarate  
All of the variables, except G, aggregated 
from village level to the city/ district level 
by adjusting to 2 conditions, the number of 
population and the number of villages per city/
district. Where ivx  are vector of characteristics 
of social and public facilities in the city/district 
which aggregated on average per village, 
including the availability of social and civic 
institutions are active activity. While hvH  are 
vector of demographic characteristics in the 
city/district which aggregated on average per 
village, including the availability of the number 
of children of school age, the ratio of female-
headed households. While vG are Gini index 
in the city/district level and the mean income. 
RESULT AND DISCUSSION
The following section is an analysis section 
that discusses the measurement of ulama’s 
leadership quality variables and then proceed 
by entering this variable into the model. 
Furthermore, we would also discusses the 
factors that determine the completion of a 
conﬂict.
Descriptive Analysis
Table below presents the data that during 
the year 2011 in Indonesia have occurred as 
many as 3519 conﬂict. Of various types. Of 
that number, only 63 conﬂicts (around 1.8%) 
which can be reconciled by the religious leaders 
(ulama/toga).
Meanwhile compared to the role of 
informal leaders, namely, public ﬁgures, can 
reconcile conﬂicts as many as 637 events 
(18.1%). This means that public ﬁgures (toma) 
managed to reconcile the conﬂict 10 times 
more than the religious leaders.
Table 2. Total Incidence of Conﬂict and Could be 
Reconciled 
 By Informal Leaders; Community and Religious Leaders
 Sorces : Authors’ calculation from PODES 2011
Meanwhile, regardless of the scale and 
impact, refer to the types of conﬂicts and 
are successfully reconciled by both informal 
leaders, there are some interesting records that 
need attention. 
First, the conﬂict between the residents is a 
type of conﬂict that dominates, 1664 or nearly 
50% of the conﬂict events. While the conﬂict 
between citizens and government oﬃcials is 
the least conﬂict occurs, which is only 109 
events (3.1%).
Second, the capacity of both informal 
leaders in reconciling the various types of 
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conﬂicts also diﬀerent. Community leaders 
(toma) could reconcile 377 events of 1664 
incidence of conﬂicts between residents 
(approximately 22.67%). Meanwhile, religious 
leaders (ulama/toga) can only reconcile 41 
occurrence (approximately 2.5%). Furthermore, 
the types of conﬂicts among students and 
between citizens and government oﬃcials, 
religious leaders are only able to reconcile one 
of the 224 and 109 events (0.4% and 0.8%).
Third, exposure data description above is at 
least a preliminary description of the position and 
the potential role of informal leaders, especially 
religious leaders in mediating the conﬂict. If you 
look at the number and type of conﬂict that is 
able to be reconciled by any informal character, 
then the inter-ethnic conﬂict is a kind of conﬂict 
with the highest ratios were signiﬁcantly able to 
be reconciled by religious leaders, that 7 of the 
63 events (about 11%), compared with a ﬁgure 
that is able to be reconciled by society, i.e. 7 of 
637 events (1.1%). Presumably it could be a 
speciﬁc ﬁeld of religious leaders in the context 
of reducing conﬂict.
Econometric Analysis Basic Results
Informal Leadership happen without 
the power or authority of the supporting 
organizations. In the organization, informal 
leader in addition to formal leader. Where 
formal leaders use power and authority to 
achieve their goals, informal leaders exert his 
inﬂuence. Thus the leadership methods diﬀer 
substantially between formal and informal 
leaders. The eﬀectiveness of informal leaders in 
the organization seems to lie in their ability to 
skillfully use social networks (La Fasto, 2001).
This seemed to imply that on one special 
condition, people move seeking a common 
identity (polarization). This is where the real, 
social capital is like a double-edged knife. 
Social capital can be directed towards positive 
beneﬁts but can also be misused for the purpose 
of "negative" (Lin, 2011). Especially when 
socio-economic conditions such as poverty and 
inequality in a community in the past is quite 
high, strong bonding social capital, rather than 
dampen inequality earlier but it can reproduce 
(divergence) poverty and inequality (Mogues, 
2005).
Findings from empirical studies that 
focus on the heterogeneity of wealth, found a 
signiﬁcant negative relationships with quality 
of religious leaders inﬂuence. 
First, the greater the inequality income 
then has the potential to weaken the inﬂuence 
of the quality of religious leaders inﬂuence. 
Even the more control variables include into 
the model, the bigger the coeﬃcient of this 
variable. Meanwhile, the negative sign of 
inequality which is found in the several types 
of conﬂict should be interpreted carefully. The 
negative sign of inequality are more relevant 
when it's viewed as a within-group inequality. 
In this case, the increase in within-group 
inequality will be followed by a weakening 
of cohesiveness in the group, which in turn 
lowers the intensity of the conﬂict, and the 
opposite is true. 
Second, the increase in polarization 
reﬂecting the extent to which a population 
is clustered around a small number of 
distant poles, as well as an increase in ethnic 
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fractionalization (social polarization) which 
reﬂects the ethnic grouping, both of which 
play a role in promoting conﬂict in the regions 
of Indonesia, as expected by hypothesis. The 
study also found that the increase in inequality 
plays a role in triggering the conﬂict. 
Third, Inequality and polarization are two 
diﬀerent sizes of people, both in theory and 
practice (Esteban, 2008). Society could becomes 
more income polarized (polarization increase) 
but in the same time income inequality decrease. 
So, both of them may have diﬀerent impact. 
Our data show that in this case, inequality and 
polarization move in the same direction. In other 
words, both of them have same impact on quality 
of religious leaders inﬂuence. 
Several studies have shown that when 
inequalities interact with polarization would 
strengthen the level of quality of religious 
leaders inﬂuence and to diminish conﬂict 
when people split into two groups of equal size 
(Indra, 2015). According to Esteban dan Ray 
(2012), individuals might eﬀectively be placing 
more weight on the group than they do on 
themselves. The reasonable interpretation for 
this case suggests that observed conﬂicts must 
have been successful in resolving the collective 
action problem, so that such conﬂicts might be 
associated with a high value of group cohesion. 
Put another way, according Esteban et 
al. (2012), the importance of polarization 
and inequality, could together be interpreted, 
using the theory, as an indicator that within-
group cohesion in the contribution of conﬂict 
resources is particularly high in situations of 
open conﬂict. Overall, the results are relevant 
to the terminology of "greed" and "grievance" 
proposed by Collier and Hoeﬄer (2004). Here, 
"greed" corresponds to conﬂict over private 
goods (natural resources), while "grievance" 
would come under the rubric of public goods 
(political rights and freedoms, or religious 
dominance).
The ﬁndings also surprising that the 
impact of the existence of social institutions 
(organizations) actually lowers the level of 
quality level of local communities religious 
leaders. The greater the ratio of the number of 
social institutions in a city/district, the weaker 
the level of quality of religious leaders inﬂuence. 
This certainly raises a big question and a pretty 
perplexing, why did this happen?. Are this social 
institution compete with religious leaders in 
order to gain their social role (inﬂuence) among 
the local community ?. 
Meanwhile, in the context of institutions in 
urban areas, social interaction is not intense and 
weak among the tenants/contracting (residential 
instability/high residential mobility) with other 
citizens, hamper the process of adoption and 
enforcement of norms of social control (Pratt 
and the Cullens, 2005). This can be seen from 
the relation variable of home-own (rumah) with 
religious leaders inﬂuence level in column (4) 
and (6) positive signiﬁcantly. May be diﬀerent 
as the majority ethnic inhabitants (contracting) 
the house was to have high moral standards, but 
the bottleneck (constraint) interaction force 
them not to engage in enforcement activities 
of social norms.
Not to forget, the high level of vulnerability 
of families proxied by proportion of households 
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headed by female, also weakens the inﬂuence 
of the quality of religious leaders. According 
to social disorganization theory, this pattern 
emerged from the burden of single parents, 
which impairs the ability of the parents to 
cooperate and as it consequences therefore will 
reduce the number of adults who are involved 
in the joint supervision of children. 
Region Effect
Interestingly, social norms evolve and 
adapt over time through interaction between 
generations. For that reason, social norms diﬀer 
between institutions, across cultures and across 
time. This gives some important implications 
for the role of social norms variation impact 
in the prevention of violation of norms or 
other anti-social activities in general. In 
this regard, in some institutional structure, 
through diﬀerent mechanisms, social norms 
do not act optimally. Referring to the social 
disorganization theory (Shaw and McKay's, 
1969), the institution heterogeneous in culture 
and ethnicity, competition between standards 
of social norms led to the institution failed to 
agree on social control. In another words, the 
community had a level of CE relatively lower.
Other ﬁndings are quite interesting in this 
context is the change of direction (sign) the 
relation of the proportion of the population 
living in urban areas with CE level. In the basic 
regression equation (annex 2) in column (1) 
and (2), the proportion of urban population 
aﬀect the level of religious leaders inﬂuence is 
positive. But in the context of Java-outside Java, 
the relation becomes negative signiﬁcantly. 
Presumably, the proportion of rural areas 
with increasingly large on the island of Java 
quite inﬂuential in determining the level of 
religious leaders inﬂuence. Hall has become 
an attractive idea to examine further how the 
socio-economic structures that exist in rural 
areas can provide a positive variation in the 
formation of the religious leaders inﬂuence.
Affluent effect (Rich vs. Poor)
For residents in a relatively prosperous 
environment, which enjoy formal job, a good 
income, and suﬃcient time and resources 
to tackle local problems (e.g., delinquency), 
a mix of strong and weak ties will empower 
each other. Strong bond allows the citizens to 
reach a consensus on the problem together, 
agree on a promising solution, and work 
collectively to try these solutions. Weak bonds 
with the outside environment enabling them 
to introduce innovative solutions to provide 
fresh ideas and information.
Conversely in disadvantaged neighborhoods, 
high levels of residential mobility (residential 
mobility), poverty, and lack of time and resources 
weakens their ability to reach consensus on 
controlling criminality outside the kinship 
network, identifying new ways to control 
crime, linkages with other agencies and act 
collectively. Moreover, in such an environment, 
disadvantaged youth, who have high levels of 
drop-out (DO) high school and a dismal labor 
market, have a strong incentive to develop 
alternative ways to get the status, perhaps in a 
way that tend to breaking the social rules.
This is evident from a reading of regression 
results showed a signiﬁcant positive relationship 
between the average (mean) household 
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expenditure with CE level. The higher average 
household expenditure in a city/district 
level, the greater the index. This relationship 
proved to be quite robust at 10% signiﬁcance 
level. Proven in the model in column (6), the 
direction of the relationship between Kaya 
with the index has not changed. However, 
its signiﬁcance so reduced, from 5% to 10%, 
with included a variety of additional control 
variables into the model.
CONCLUTION AND RECOMMENDATION
The main conclusion of this paper is that 
heterogeneity in communities socio-economic 
structure which proixed by polarization and 
inequality (of income), has negative eﬀect on 
the quality of inﬂuence of religious leaders. 
This study found that those reduce religious 
leaders (toga) role in resolving conﬂict (mass 
brawl) at their community level signiﬁcantly. 
In the process to arrive at this conclusion, we 
found more interesting results. Here are some 
of them. First, there is a quadratic pattern of 
the relationship between income inequality 
proxied by the Gini index to inﬂuence the 
quality of inﬂuence of informal leaders.
Second, the structure, the circumstances 
(context) other socioeconomic also proved a 
signiﬁcant role in determining the quality of 
the inﬂuence of religious leaders. Or indirectly, 
cause a conﬂict can be resolved by informal 
leaders, especially religious leaders was not 
as simple as we think it is. To understand the 
dynamics of internal conﬂict many speciﬁc 
indicators need to be taken into account, such 
as poverty and high population growth, scarcity 
of resources, discrimination and powerlessness 
of minorities and other groups in society. Mix 
these variables can, but need not always, lead 
to social stress, violence and war.
Therefore it's important to distinguish 
between the structural causes of conﬂict 
and the proximate cause that triggered the 
escalation of the conﬂict. This is the reason why 
conﬂict prevention today should diﬀerentiate 
between short-term and structural prevention. 
Structural causes primarily include factors 
related to State weakness, poverty, political 
injustice and economic hardship. Thus, a 
structural preventive should have economic, 
human needs strong and government bias, 
and should consist of development assistance, 
local capacity building, and assistance in the 
selection and monitoring of human rights.
Third, polarization and inequality 
contribute signiﬁcantly to the escalation of 
conﬂict, making the government should be 
acutely aware of the potential dangers arising 
from widening group-based alienation as well 
as strengthening in- group identiﬁcation. 
According to the Between-Group Transfer 
axiom suggested by Foster and Wolfson 
(1992), one of the best ways to curb the 
strengthening of polarization is through 
redistribution of income (or wealth) from the 
rich to the poor. Redistribution of income (or 
wealth) are respectively the transfer of income 
(or wealth) from some individuals to others by 
means of a social mechanism such as taxation, 
monetary policies, welfare, land reform, 
charity, conﬁscation, divorce or tort law.
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RESEARCH LIMITATION
This paper has several  important 
deﬁciencies that must be addressed in a variety 
of advanced research. 
First, forming the source exploration of 
the quality of religious leaders role is still very 
limited. This paper only take a mass brawl 
which resolved by religious leaders as the proxy 
for their inﬂuence (role) quality. This certainly 
requires further clariﬁcation to believe that 
indeed it is valid to represent the level of quality 
of religious leaders role. 
Second, the positive impact of interaction 
between polarization and inequality with 
the quality of religious leaders role leaves the 
interesting question. How this could become 
and through what mechanism caused this fact 
?. Uncertainty about these mechanisms raises 
questions with important policy implications. 
This is an important information that could 
be a conﬂict reduction policy instruments that 
can be intervened by the government. 
Then also as usual social-themed research, 
the results of the regression estimation in a 
variety of models in this paper, suspected 
still contains many problems endogeneitas. 
In understanding the patterns and processes 
of causality, which is the cause and which 
the eﬀect, within the scope of the social 
phenomenon that estimate free from bias, the 
accuracy and ﬂying hours was crucial.
Of it, is expected to answer questions 
about how important the prevention of 
anti-conﬂict through a program which 
includes strengthening religious leaders in 
the community, in times of extreme such as 
the increasingly rising income inequality? To 
what extent that public authorities should be 
concerned with income and class polarization?. 
Hopefully, this small and simple paper 
will help generate interest in the issues and can 
answer most questions related to community-
based crime prevention.
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